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Payments for Environmental Services (PES) have been widely adopted worldwide as a new market-based
initiative for conservation and environmental management. In Indonesia several PES initiatives exist
ranging from watershed and terrestrial to marine ecosystem. Nevertheless, developing and managing
PES programs in Indonesia are exacerbated by the complexity of institutional arrangements. Fiscal
constraints are still the main obstacle of sustainable ﬁnancing of PES mechanism. Rules and regulations
with regard to PES ﬁscal mechanism are rather lacking, making it difﬁcult for effective management of
PES programs. As a consequence, efﬁcient mechanism between users (ﬁrms) and environmental services
is rather weak. This paper explores such a problem based on case studies of two existing PES programs in
Indonesia. The paper analyzes the complexity of ﬁscal mechanism as a derivative of regulations and
discusses challenges to overcome the constraints.
& 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
During the last three decades, Indonesia's economic develop-
ment under President Suharto's administration has relied heavily
on the extraction of natural resources, including oil, gas, and
forests. Although the Indonesian economy has grown 6.11% per
year during the last 10 years (Indonesian Central Statistics Agency,
2012), this growth has affected Indonesia's environment. A study
conducted by the World Bank (Leitmann et al., 2009) shows that
the cost of environmental degradation and climate change was
over 5% of the GDP per year and will likely increase. In the forestry
sector, Indonesia is well known in the international arena as the
country with the third largest area of forest degradation. For
example, Leitmann et al. (2009) indicate that, between 1990 and
2000, some 21 million hectares of forest cover were lost due to
unsustainable forestry practices.
In response to the cost of environmental degradation, climate
change, and Indonesia's unsustainable forestry practices, signiﬁ-
cant changes have occurred in terms of pursuing Indonesianr B.V.
: +62 251 8624/594.
zi),
Open access under CC BY-NC-Neconomic development since the end of Suharto's regime in 1998.
These changes include the management of natural resources. One of
the signiﬁcant changes regarding natural resource and environ-
mental management is the decentralization of natural resource
management and recognizing the environment as one of the key
pillars of economic development. Previously, Indonesia's develop-
ment was based on three pillars: (1) pro-growth, (2) pro-employ-
ment, and (3) pro-poor. Acknowledging the importance of the
environment, however, has led to the inclusion of a fourth pillar
into economic development: pro-environment. This pillar has been
formalized in the Indonesian Medium-Term of the National Devel-
opment Plan of 2010–2014 as stated in Presidential Regulation No.
5/2010, in which one of the eight development missions is to
achieve a “green and everlasting Indonesia.”
Various strategies have been developed to overcome environ-
mental problems in the country. In addition to the conventional
command and control mechanisms (e.g. standards, bans, permits,
and quotas), market-based instruments (e.g. fees) and payment for
environmental services (PES) schemes are now gaining popularity
as vehicles for the protection of the environment. The PES scheme
or mechanism, in particular, is gaining more support from local
government and communities because of its attractiveness as an
incentive mechanism and as a poverty reduction program (Antle
and Stoorvogel, 2009; Lipper et al., 2009; Pagiola et al., 2004). For
at least two reasons, it is also in the interest of local governments
and communities to adopt the PES instrument as they learn from
the past failures in managing the environment using commandD license.
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establishment of Law 32/2004 on decentralization, the manage-
ment of natural resources and environment has been transferred
to the local government. That is, the local government has full
authority to manage their natural resources for the beneﬁt of their
own welfare. Therefore, PES schemes could be considered a
promising alternative method to managing natural resources.
Second, at the local level, adopting the PES mechanism is relatively
more acceptable for the community since it involves local people
instead of a top-down approach by means of command and
control, which is more or less similar to the centralistic manage-
ment approach under Suharto's regime.
Payment for Environmental Services schemes has been widely
adopted in Indonesia. They range from pilot programs to more
established schemes. The PES concept was initially introduced in
2002 through collaboration between the Institute of Research,
Information, and Education of Social and Economic Affairs (LP3ES)
and the International Institute for Environment and Development
(IIED) (Budhi et al., 2008). The collaboration between these two
institutions led to the establishment of some PES pilot projects in
Cidanau (Banten Province), Brantas (East Java), and West Lombok
Regency (West Nusa Tenggara). Following these three pilot pro-
jects, other PES-like schemes were established in Sumber Jaya,
Lampung; in Sungai Wain, East Kalimantan; in Cirebon-Kuningan,
West Java; and in other locations. Most PES schemes in Indonesia
are established in the areas of forest and watershed managements.
These two areas are the most complex management areas because
of their multifaceted interactions among components and institu-
tions such as inter-provincial arrangements and inter-sectoral
mechanisms.
Although various institutions (such as communities, private
institutions, and the local government) have chosen PES schemes
as one of the market-based mechanisms for environmental man-
agement and ecosystem conservation, they were only formally
recognized when the Indonesian Law on Environmental Protection
and Management was established in 2009. This law, Law No. 32/
2009, recognizes two different categories of environmental man-
agement schemes: (1) payment for environmental services (PES)
and (2) compensation for environmental services (CES). Both
terms refer to the same schemes (i.e. using market-based mechan-
isms for managing the environment, especially in the area of
conservation), but the law distinctively separates CES and PES with
regard to the identity of the institutions involved. The term “CES”
indicates a scheme established between the governments (e.g.
between two provinces or between a province and the central
government). In contrast, the term “PES” indicates a scheme
established by a private institution (e.g. a scheme between a
drinking water company and a community).
A conceptual and operational deﬁnition of Indonesian PES
schemes is currently being drafted under the government regula-
tion on economic instrument for environmental management.
However, as of February 2013, the draft is still awaiting endorse-
ment. Nonetheless, most PES schemes in the country have been
adopting the commonly used PES deﬁnition used by scholars such
as Wunder (2005, 2008) and Greiber (2009). This deﬁnition
speciﬁes that a PES is a voluntary transaction where a well-
deﬁned environmental service (ES) is being ‘bought’ by a mini-
mum of one buyer from a minimum of one ES provider, if (and
only if) the ES provider secures the ES provision conditionally
(Wunder, 2005). This general deﬁnition emphasizes four aspects of
a PES scheme: (1) the voluntary transaction, (2) well-deﬁned
environmental services, (3) the buyer and seller, and (4) the
conditionality of the transaction. Some of these components, such
as voluntary transaction and conditionality, might not be compa-
tible in the Indonesian case, and will be discussed further in
this paper.This paper investigates how Indonesia PES programs function
when a number of institutional aspects are involved. In particular,
the paper attempts to address the complexity of institutional
arrangements as well as institutional governance, including ﬁscal
matters concerned with PES scheme implementation. It focuses on
two PES schemes in Lampung and West Nusa Tenggara. These two
PES schemes have different institutional arrangements, different
issues with regard to property rights, and different schemes of
buyers and sellers. The other reasons to choose these two schemes
are that both schemes have unique “success” and “failures” stories
viewed from different perspectives. They are also interesting for
institutional analysis due to the complexity of the institutional
arrangements in these two schemes. The paper begins with an
overview of the two different PES programs in Indonesia followed
by a discussion of their institutional aspects. It then concludes
with some implications, lessons learned, and challenges that need
to be addressed for future PES development.2. Payment for environmental services and institutional
aspects: general overview
Institutions play a signiﬁcant role in a PES scheme since a PES
scheme cannot work in a vacuum. Institutions are written and
unwritten rules, norms, and constraints that humans devise to
reduce uncertainty and control their environment (Menard and
Shirley, 2005). Institutions also regulate what to do and not to do
(Corbera et al., 2009). In the context of PES schemes, institutions
also regulate human interaction with natural resources and they
affect the resilience and services of the environment (Dietz et al.,
2003).
In order to implement effective and efﬁcient PES schemes, an
institutional framework is required. Law and policy on the PES
mechanism, for example, are the basic ingredients for the estab-
lishment of a PES institution (Greiber, 2009; Ruhweza and Masiga,
2007). They determine the key actors in a PES scheme, set the
rules for the establishment and operation of a PES scheme, and
provide general administrative guidelines (Greiber, 2009). Simi-
larly, Vatn (2010) also emphasizes the importance of institutions in
PES implementation. Most PES schemes depend strongly on the
community and state involvement. Therefore, they are not purely
voluntary market transactions, and rules and other institutional
arrangements are required to make them work. The presence of
state intervention, for example, is necessary to provide a legal
framework since a PES scheme involves a contract, land ownership
rights, and transaction costs.
In the context of PES schemes, Corbera et al. (2009) show that
an institutional analysis could shed light at least on three impor-
tant issues. First, an institutional analysis could help to identify the
potential tension between PES design rules and PES players as well
as potential controversies over who owns the services and who
beneﬁts from them. Second, an institutional analysis could be used
to measure the positive and negative impacts of the schemes and
the distributional aspects of the scheme (i.e. who should be
included in the program and who should be excluded). Third, an
institutional analysis could identify how a PES scheme could
inﬂuence the local ecosystem management practices and cultural
values, and factors that could strengthen the beneﬁciaries’ interest
in conserving the ecosystem. Corbera et al. (2009) further empha-
size that an institutional framework analysis could contribute to
improving the PES scheme design and overcome potential nega-
tive outcomes that might arise from their implementation.
Various institutional approaches can be used to analyze the
effectiveness and the performance of PES schemes. Kaplowitz et al.
(2008), for example, use a situation, structure, and performance
(SSP) framework to analyze a PES scheme in Eastern Costa Rica.
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impacted and how they are impacted), and they suggest an
alternative institutional arrangement that might control the rela-
tionship between the environmental services and actors. Corbera
et al. (2009), Greiber (2009), the Institute for Global Environmental
Strategies (IGES) (2011), and Lipper et al. (2009) use different
frameworks when analyzing the institutional dimensions of PES
schemes. Corbera et al. (2009), for example, use the institutional
framework of design, interplay, and performance to analyze a PES
scheme in Mexico. A similar approach was followed by Khatri
(2009) to analyze a PES scheme in Nepal. Vatn (2009), on the other
hand, argues that using institutional settings that favor social
rationality and communicative action are the most consistent
approach for the analysis of PES schemes. In contrast, Farley and
Constanza (2010) argue that the physical and economic character-
istics of ecosystem services will determine what institutional
setting is suitable for a PES scheme. This line of argument implicitly
assumes that one has to understand the nature of the physical and
economic settings of a PES to understand the institutional aspect of
the PES mechanism.
Perhaps the simplest way to analyze PES effectiveness
by means of institutional framework is by using institutional
attributes and their interaction with the physical attributes of
environmental services. Institutional attributes such as legal
framework, property rights, and transaction costs are important
components of PES schemes and these attributes are linked to the
physical characteristics of PES schemes. For example, a PES
program for carbon sequestration may need a different institu-
tional set-up than a PES program for a watershed due to different
physical characteristics. Alston et al. (2013) use such an approach
to assess the effectiveness of various schemes. An almost similar
approach can be found in Klein (2000) who categorizes institu-
tional attributes into two general categories: (1) institutional
environment and (2) institutional arrangement. Institutional
environment refers to the background constraints or rules of the
game that guide the behavior of individuals (e.g. law and property
rights), while institutional arrangement refers to a governance
structure designed to involve partners in mediating economic
relationships. The attributes of this institutional arrangement
include contracts and transaction costs (Klein, 2000). This paper
will follow both the approaches of Klein (2000) and Alston et al.
(2013) by exploring the institutional attributes of Indonesian PES
schemes with respect to legal aspects, ﬁscal arrangement, prop-
erty rights, and transaction costs. These attributes are dominant
attributes and mostly concern institutional aspects that currently
hinder the implementation of PES schemes in Indonesia. Legal,
ﬁscal, and property rights, for example, have been identiﬁed as a
main stumbling block in Indonesian PES schemes (Budhi et al.,
2008), while transaction costs constitute a signiﬁcant portion of
the PES establishment in Indonesia (Ariﬁn, 2005).3. Brief overview of the payment for environmental services
schemes under discussion
Most PES schemes in Indonesia are located in forested regions
because the Indonesian forest sector has suffered massive degra-
dation due to deforestation and illegal logging activities. Although
Indonesia's forests account for about 10% of the world's remaining
forests and are important for Indonesia's economy, biodiversity,
and freshwater supply, the forest cover has declined over the last
two decades. Data from various sources indicate that Indonesia's
forest degradation occurred at a rate of 1.8–3.6 million hectares
per year during the 1990s until 2000, and at an average rate of 728
thousand hectares per year from 2001 to 2006 (Yeager, 2008).
Developing PES schemes in forested regions not only makes sensewith respect to conservation efforts but also is important in
maintaining environmental services in these regions using
market-based mechanisms.
Payment for environmental services schemes in Indonesia is
driven by various initiatives within communities, private institu-
tions (e.g. electricity companies, steel industries, and drinking
water companies), national and international nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), and the local government. They are estab-
lished for different purposes and schemes. For example, a national
steel industry located in Banten Province, Java, initiated PES
schemes within local communities in the upstream area to protect
the water supply for this industry. Similarly, a state hydropower
company used its own corporate social responsibility fund (CSR) to
establish a PES scheme in the forested area of Lampung. Regard-
less of the purposes of these industries and the processes of
development, PES schemes play an important role in replacing the
failed command and control system that was used in Indonesia
throughout the last three decades. This system failed due to weak
enforcement and corruption (International Crisis Group, 2001).
A comprehensive overview of PES schemes in Indonesia can be
found in Suyanto et al. (2005) and an additional review can be
found in Ariﬁn (2005).
This paper will focus on two PES schemes: (1) one developed to
counter a water crisis and watershed protection in the upstream
forest area in Lombok, West Nusa Tenggara Province, and (2) one
developed to counter forest degradation and sedimentation in
Sumber Jaya, Lampung Province. The data and information were
gathered from a series of focus group discussions (FGDs) con-
ducted with key stakeholders (i.e. farmer groups (sellers), buyers
(water users), facilitators (mediators), related agencies, and local
village informal leaders). The FDGs were held from February 2011
to May 2011 in Sumber Jaya, and during April 2012 in Lombok.
3.1. The payment for environmental services scheme in Lombok,
West Nusa Tenggara
The PES scheme in Lombok, West Nusa Tenggara Province, was
initiated by various NGOs such as LP3ES. It is continued by the
World Wide Fund (WWF) Lombok chapter and KONSEPSI (a local
NGO), and is located in the West Lombok Regency in the village of
Sedau where “the heart of the water sources” of Lombok is found.
The upstream area is part of Rinjani Mountain, one of the volcanic
mountains in West Nusa Tengara Province. Forest degradation,
illegal logging, unsustainable farming, and shifting cultivation
practices in this area have led to severe environmental problems
resulting in decreased water quantity and quality (Prasetyo et al.,
2009). The decrease in water quantity and quality was exacerbated
further by a growth in the tourism industry, such as hotel and
other tourism infrastructure development, which drew more
water from the springs. Prasetyo et al. (2009) state that, by
2003, 40% of the 85 springs had disappeared due to the afore-
mentioned destructive practices. Both water quality and quantity
are vital for those living in Mataram City, the capital of the
province.
Recognizing these critical issues related to forested regions and
water problems, the PES scheme was set up after a series of
processes were completed including a study of the economic
valuation of Mount Rinjani's ecosystem, a survey of the Mataram
City residents’ willingness to pay (WTP) for environmental ser-
vices, and stakeholder dialogs. The study of the residents’ WTP
was conducted in 2004 by KONSEPSI using questionnaires com-
pleted by respondents from household registered tap water users.
They found that the WTP was between Rupiah (Rp) 500 ($0.05 U.S.)
and Rp 5000 ($0.50 U.S.) per month. Following the survey of the
residents’ WTP, a series of dialogs with local government agencies,
village leaders, and farmers in the upstream areas were held
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and dialog yielded useful inputs in setting up the initial design of
the PES scheme and building trust among the stakeholders
involved in the program.
The ﬁrst trial of payment from the tap water users of the East
Mataram precinct was held in February 2006, and, in 2007, the
local bylaw on payment for environmental services was endorsed
by the West Lombok parliament. The PES scheme is relatively
simple. Farmers in the upstream area are compensated for plant-
ing trees and preserving water resources. The source of funding
derives from the downstream users of the water resources. In this
case, the funding source comes from households in the city of
Mataram who use tap water from the regional drinking water
company known as Perusahaan Daerah Air Minum (PDAM) or
Regional Company of Drinking Water. The water users (i.e. the
registered tap water households) pay a ﬂat rate of Rp 1000 per
month (approximately $0.10 U.S.). Even though the initial proposal
of PES scheme also included having hotels and restaurants pay the
same charge, this has not been implemented due to legal reasons.
The payment is embedded in the residents’ monthly water bill
and is designated speciﬁcally as the “Pembayaran Jasa Lingkungan”
or PES. It is enforced by local regulation (bylaw). In this sense, the
payment is “mandatory” (Pirard, 2012) rather than voluntary,
which differentiates this scheme from a typical PES scheme. The
money collected from the water users is then managed by a multi-
stakeholder institution or Institusi Multi Pihak (IMP) consisting of
local government agencies (led by the forestry agency), NGOs, the
drinking water company (PDAM), and representatives of the
upstream communities. The IMP is recognized in the Mataram
City Bylaw and, therefore, is the ofﬁcial agency that manages the
PES scheme in the watershed areas of Lombok. The revenue is
collected from PDAM by Dinas Pendapatan Daerah (DISPENDA) or
the Local Revenue Ofﬁce and is deposited in the Local Revenue
Ofﬁce under the Dinas Kehutanan or the Local Forestry Ofﬁce's
account. The Local Revenue Ofﬁce then distributes the funding to
the IMP, which then allocates the money throughout the forested
community based on proposal programs submitted to the IMP.
After a proposal is approved and funding is received, the forest
restoration program is then carried out by the community. Since
the disbursement of the ﬁrst funding in 2009, more than Rp 445
million ($44,500 U.S.) has been distributed to four farmer groups
in different villages. The payment system for the PES scheme in
Lombok is illustrated in Fig. 1.
Although the PES scheme has been running for 4 years, it is
difﬁcult to judge its success and effectiveness. However, results
from the FGDs conducted with groups of PES-member farmers in
the upstream regions suggest that there has been an improvement
in the upstream regions. More trees are being planted, and there is
an economic impact for the farmers as a result of the program.
The leader of one of the farmer's groups, for example, claims that
his income from the coffee business has increased due to funding
from the PES scheme. According to him, this increase in income is
attributed to an increase in the frequency of grinding coffee beans
from once a week before the PES scheme to three times a week
after the PES scheme. He stated that the increase in the frequency
of grinding the beans increases his revenues from selling the
coffee to the markets.
3.2. The payment for environmental services scheme in Sumber Jaya,
Lampung
The second PES scheme operates in the forest village of Sumber
Jaya, Lampung Province. The name of the village itself literally
means “source of glory,” which is a non-native name of Lampung.
It was established in 1952 as a designated area of transmigration
for migrants from the West Java Province, and, therefore, is mostlypopulated with migrants from West Java. The population is
approximately 80,000 people. Forty percent of the Sumber Jaya
region consists of protected forests while 10% of the area is a
national park. This designation was established in 1990 under
Suharto's regime (Ariﬁn, 2005). Nevertheless, only approximately
10% of the protected forests and the national park are forested. The
rest has been deforested for a quite some time (Pender et al.,
2008).
Not far from Sumber Jaya's protected forested area, a hydro-
power company in Way Besai has installed more than a 100 MW
generation capacity to provide electricity to Lampung and the
surrounding areas. The hydropower dam has been experiencing
water deﬁcit and sedimentation due to logging and deforestation
activities in the upstream area. The forested area and its watershed
in Sumber Jaya, therefore, play a pivotal role in ensuring the
functionality of the hydropower dam. In addition, it also plays a
crucial role in maintaining the livelihood of upstream commu-
nities since the forested area and its watershed contain fertile soil
that supports coffee and rice cultivations, which are commodities
the community relies upon.
The hydropower company known as Pembangkit Listrik Tenaga
Air (PLTA) Way Besai used its Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)
funding to provide incentives to the farmers in the upstream area
communities to conserve the forest. The PES scheme was then
established with help from the World AgroForestry Centre (ICRAF)
under its Rewarding Upland Poor for Environmental Services
(RUPES) program in 2004. The ICRAF also facilitates contract
mechanisms and provides monitoring programs for the PES
scheme. The objective of the PES scheme is twofold: (1) to reduce
sedimentation, which ensures water ﬂow to the dam, and (2) to
rehabilitate the deforested area while simultaneously ensuring a
sustainable livelihood for the upstream communities. The pay-
ment system for the PES scheme is based on evaluation criteria on
the reduction in water turbidity resulting from the conservation
program. If farmer groups are able to reduce water turbidity by
30% (e.g. from 100 g soil/l to 70 g soil/l), the groups will be
awarded an electric turbine for micro hydropower worth Rp 20
million (approximately $2000 U.S.). If the turbidity reduction is
less than 30%, the compensation will be awarded in cash based on
the range of turbidity level: If the turbidity reduction is less than 10%, the compensation
will be Rp 2.5 million ($250 U.S.). If the turbidity reduction is between 10% and 20%, the com-
pensation is Rp 5 million ($500 U.S.). If the turbidity reduction is between 21% and 29%, the com-
pensation is Rp 7.5 million ($750 U.S.).
In addition, the payment scheme is not only in the form of a
cash transfer but also in other forms such as a revolving fund for
goat farming, the development of micro hydropower installations,
and tree seeds.
The PES system in Sumber Jaya's forested area is in two
different formats. The ﬁrst is a typical PES scheme between the
private sector and the community. Farmers form a farmer's
organization or group, which then receives a small amount of
funds from PLTA in exchange for planting trees, which they can
also beneﬁt from by harvesting the trees. Coffee agroforestry was
chosen as an appropriate PES product given its economic value to
the community. The farmer's group is also provided with a small
amount of funds to purchase goats for an animal husbandry
program. It is expected that the goats will induce tree or grass
planting because goats need to be grass-fed. These grasses would
then retain water and reduce soil erosion, thus reducing sedimen-
tation in the dam area. The second format involves local govern-
ment agencies. In this case, the forestry agency gives incentives
PDAM District Revenue Agency
Forestry
Agency
Multi-
Stakeholder
Institution (IMP)
Upstream/
Forest
Community
Forest and 
watershed 
area
Water users
(households)
Water service
Water bill
Fiscal/revenue affair
Budget
allocation
Allocation
Funding 
programs
Forest restoration programs
Environmental 
Services (water use)
Fig. 1. PES mechanism in West Lombok.
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of rights to use the land for economic and conservation purposes.
Land rights are expected to provide incentives for farmers to
engage in protecting forests and the environment. Secure land
tenure is critical in this case. Uncertainty in land tenure during
Suharto's era has led to a series of conﬂicts between migrant
farmers, which have led to a series of evictions (Wendland et al.,
2010). In response to these conﬂicts and evictions, farmers illegally
cultivate the land and deforest areas.
The ﬂow between environmental services and payments from
buyer to provider in the Sumber Jaya case is different from that of
the Lombok case. Because the contract is between the hydropower
company and farmers, there is no need to have a local law (bylaw)
in place as in Lombok. Additionally, multi-stakeholder institutions
are not required in the Lampung case. The payments can be made
directly to the farmer's group as long as they submit the proposal.
River Care Community, an organization formed by local NGOs,
provides guidelines for writing the proposal and selects the best
programs to be funded under the PES scheme. Here, the role of the
local government in managing PES ﬁscal matters and funding
management is minimal compared to the role of the local
government in the Lombok case. Nonetheless, the role of the
government agency (i.e. the Forestry Agency) is critical in provid-
ing secure land rights for the PES scheme this area. Without this
governmental involvement, the PES program cannot be executed
because of land conﬂicts and uncertainty in property rights. Fig. 2
provides a graphical description of the PES system in Sumber Jaya,
Lampung.
A simple comparison between the PES schemes in Lombok and
Lampung in terms of problems they addressed (seller and buyer
types as well as programs and payment schemes) can be seen in
Table 1. The “Inclusion” column indicates the degree of interven-
tion and stakeholder involvement in the PES program.4. Institutional analysis
4.1. Institutional environment: legal and ﬁscal arrangement
The institutional environment forms the framework in which
human action takes place (Klein, 2000). Two attributes of the
institutional environment are laws (the legal component or
regulations) and property rights. Other attributes include norms
and social conventions. In the PES context, regulations not only
serve to harmonize the roles and responsibilities of individualpartners (Greiber, 2009), but they also serve to reduce the
uncertainties of managing PES programs. This paper will discuss
the laws or the legal component and the property rights. Discus-
sion on the norms and social conventions of PES schemes can be
found in Ariﬁn (2005).
Theoretically, the PES mechanism draws on Coasian principles
(Coase, 1960) with well-deﬁned property rights and low transac-
tion costs. Yet, empirically, it is in these legal components,
property rights, and transaction costs aspects that PES schemes
in Indonesia face challenges. The paper will also pay more
attention to the role of ﬁscal matters in a PES scheme. The ﬁscal
component is essential to make sure that the PES system will not
run into ﬁscal hurdles (Mayrand and Paquin, 2004). This is because
every PES scheme requires a speciﬁc payment structure. Therefore,
a different ﬁscal arrangement might be needed. Fiscal reform
might be necessary to allow room for a PES scheme to work such
as in the case of ﬁscal reform in the Costa Rican Forest Law
(Mayrand and Paquin, 2004). The ﬁscal arrangement for the PES
scheme in Indonesia is rather complicated due to overlapping
regulations as shown in the following section.
Most PES programs in Indonesia, as described above, are
located in the forested areas. Yet, the forest areas in Indonesia
are subject to several regulations and are managed under different
authorities. The list below contains many of the laws and govern-
ment regulations related both directly and indirectly to forest
management, environmental services, funding mechanisms, and
ﬁscal arrangements: Law No. 5/1960 on Basic Regulation on Agrarian Principles.
 Law No. 41/1999 on Forestry.
 Law No. 26/2007 on Spatial Planning.
 Law No. 32/2009 on Environmental Protection and Management.
 Law No. 7/2004 on Water Resources.
 Law No. 32/2004 on Regional Autonomy.
 Law No. 4/2009 on Coal and Mining.
 Law No. 17/2003 on State Finance Management.
 Law No. 28/2009 on Regional Taxation.
 Law No. 20/1997 on Non-taxation Revenues.
 Law No. 33/2004 on Fiscal Balancing between Central Govern-
ment and Regions.
 Law No. 9/1985 on Conservation of Natural Resources and the
Ecosystem.
 Government Regulation No. 34/2002 on Forest Planning and
Utilization of Forest Areas.
 Government Regulation No. 3/2008 on Forestry Governance.
Farmers
In forest area
Hydro Power
Utility
Proposal
Reward/Payment
(tree planting, Microhydro
and  animal Husbandry)
Forestry
Agency
Granted 
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Fig. 2. PES mechanism in Sumber Jaya Lampung.
Table 1
The characteristics of PES schemes in Lampung and Lombok.
Location PES case Seller type Buyer type Programs Payment scheme Inclusion
Lombok Water crisis and watershed
protection in upstream forest
area
Community Local government tap
water/drinking company
Tree planting,
tree seed
program
Water charge/bill
(ﬂat rate)
First municipal PES program, government
intervention: moderate (through IMP)
Lampung Forest degradation,
sedimentation
Community State-owned
hydropower
Coffee
agroforestry,
husbandry
CSR funding through
program proposal
Private operation. Government
intervention through granting land rights
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Forest Use. Government Regulation No. 10/2010 on Land Use Change in
Forest Areas. Government Regulation No. 42/2009 on Forest Financing.
 Government Regulation No. 22/1997 on Non-taxation Revenues.
Concerning the PES scheme, some of the aforementioned laws
and regulations are not compatible. One such incompatibility
involves the issue of ﬁscal matters. For private PES schemes with
no government intervention, the transfer of payment can be made
directly between buyers and sellers without any legal implications.
However, in the semi-public PES scheme, such as the one in
Lombok, this ﬁscal issue can be complicated. Law Nos. 28/2009, 17/
2003, and 20/1997 do not recognize revenue from environmental
services. Therefore, there is no room for earmarking such revenue.
In the Lombok case, for example, revenue from the PES scheme
should be treated as “other revenues” and fees collected from the
PES scheme should be deposited in the Local Revenue Ofﬁce under
the Dinas Kehutanan's (Local Forestry Ofﬁce) account. Thus, in
principle, this revenue could be used for other purposes than
environmental services.
The complexity of the ﬁscal arrangement caused the PES
payment scheme in Lombok to be suspended. Individuals involved
in the collection of payment were questioned and accused of
wrongdoing by the local police and the district attorney for
collecting money from tap water users, which is not recognized
under the taxation law. The earmarking problem perhaps is not
unique to Indonesia. May et al. (2004), for example, show that
although ecological value-added taxation has been practiced in
Brazil and has been shown to have a signiﬁcant impact on the PESscheme, the ﬁscal problem in terms of earmarking revenue
remains an obstacle.
Conﬂicting regulations on the ﬁscal aspect of the PES scheme also
exist related to the water charge. Law No. 28/2009 on regional
taxation allows the regional authority to impose a charge on surface
water and deep water, yet Government Regulation No. 34/2002
states that water utilization is one of the utilization forms of
environmental services. Thus, a water charge on the forested area
is part of forestry revenue known as the provision of forest resources.
These two regulations might not be compatible with Law No. 7/2004
on water resources whereby water used for basic needs and
agriculture inputs is free of charge. These three conﬂicting regula-
tions make it difﬁcult to deﬁnewater payment clearly, even using the
PES scheme. In an ex-ante situation, payment for water services face
ﬁscal hurdles to which laws should be used as the legal basis. In an
ex-post situation, the earmarking of revenue from environmental
services has no legal basis. Fig. 3 illustrates the complexity of the
ﬁscal mechanisms of collecting and distributing the PES payment in
the watershed area in Indonesia.
Fig. 3 also describes the complexity of overlapping authorities
on the management of forested areas. In the upstream area
(forested area), at least seven regulations overlap with respect to
the same area: Laws Nos. 5/1960, 41/1999, 26/2007, 32/2009,
4/2009, 7/2004, and 9/1985. For example, Law No. 5/1960 recog-
nizes right to land into three categories: (1) state land, (2) com-
munity land, and (3) private land. Implicitly, the law recognizes
land property under community (known as ulayat in Indonesia).
Law No. 41/1999, on the other hand, does not recognize hutan adat
(customary forest) owned by the community. Similarly, Law No.
41/1999 often overlaps with Law No. 4/2009 with regard to
exploitation in protected forests. Law No. 41/1999 strictly prohibits
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Fig. 3. Overlapping laws and regulations related to PES schemes.
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such a prohibition is not recognized in Law No. 4/2009 and mining
permits are often issued in the protected forest based on the
availability of mineral resources. In the downstream area, when
dealing with the payment for the PES scheme, several laws and
regulations overlap with respect to how to collect the payment
and who should collect it. These include Laws Nos. 17/2003, 28/
2009, 20/1997, and 33/2004. In addition, the watershed is bor-
dered by many municipalities wherein Law No. 32/2004, concern-
ing regional autonomy, states that bordering municipalities have
the autonomous right to manage watersheds in areas under their
jurisdiction. This undoubtedly complicates the overall PES process
once the government is involved.
4.2. Property rights
The second aspect of institutional environment is property
rights. Property rights play a crucial role in a PES scheme. Clear
property rights entitle sellers to utilize their choice fully regarding
the assets. As Demsetz (1967) states, property rights should not be
interpreted narrowly to the legal notion of “right” but should be
interpreted as the ability to make all manner of choices. Demsetz
(1967) also note that different patterns of property rights could
lead to different patterns of behavior. This notion carries signiﬁ-
cant implications for PES schemes because this issue underlies the
problem of PES mechanism. In the PES mechanism, property rights
should help to deﬁne clearly who holds the respective right over
ecosystem services. However, most ecosystem services in Indone-
sia's PES schemes are derived from forested areas in which
property rights are problematic. According to the national law,
forested areas are under state ownership except when traditionalcommunities hold the title of ownership per customary law.
The watershed systems in which most PES schemes are practiced
are also frequently tied to the land use system. Here, the National Land
Agency or Badan Pertanahan Nasional (BPN) is the only authorized
agency that can issue certiﬁcates of entitlement for land. Complexities
of the land management system and land ownership raise the
awareness of uncertainties in many PES schemes in Indonesia.
Recognizing such complexity in the property rights system,
some PES schemes, such as those in Lampung, seek a way to
resolve the problem. In the forested areas, another low-level
regulation can be used to bridge the gap: the Forestry Ministerial
Decree No. 31/2001. This decree recognizes that Hutan Kemasyar-
akatan (HKm) or community-based forest management grants a
5-year tenure of land as long as the community forms a farmer's
group. Using this mechanism, the PES scheme in Lampung is able
to provide secure temporary property rights to groups of farmers
under the PES scheme for at least 5 years. The tenure can be
extended up to 25 years to utilize state-owned forest land. Such
“hitchhiking” on low-level regulations to address property rights
issues might reinforce public policy toward forestry management
in general (Pirard, 2012) so that the PES scheme and Hutan
Kemasyakatan could serve as a good example of how a PES scheme
works in the absence of property rights. Nevertheless, given that
the initial allocation of tenure in Lampung was based on a “ﬁrst
come ﬁrst served” basis, conﬂict over access to and use of state-
owned land still occurs due to the heterogeneity of the commu-
nity. Most of the people living in this area are migrant workers
from Java, and they face continuing encroachment from other
migrant people from Java. The conﬂict over access to and use of
state-owned land might hinder the success of PES schemes in the
future if no proper solution is found.
First best value
Of asset
Benefits and 
Costs of
ownership
Benefit of full property rights
Benefit due to incomplete
property rights
Reduction of PES’s benefits
due to insufficient contract
Transaction cost (TC)
TC due to incomplete
Property right
A
B
Second best value
Vc Vo
C
Fig. 4. Transaction cost, property right and contract.
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The third aspect of the institutional analysis of PES schemes is
institutional arrangements. This is similar to what Williamson
(1996) refers as “institutions of governance.” Here, the role of
contract, organization, and transaction costs associated with
property rights plays a greater role in determining the success of
the PES scheme. In the PES mechanism, institution governance
includes buyers and sellers as well as the management of PES
organization. Since the notion of PES governance has been
implicitly discussed in Section 3, only the notion of transaction
costs in PES schemes will be discussed in this section.
Transaction costs are ubiquitous. Transaction costs also have
important implications for environmental governance since with
positive transaction costs, environmental governance cannot be
designed (Paavola and Adger, 2006). In the PES scheme, transac-
tion costs could occur from the designing stage (ex-ante) to the
monitoring and evaluation stages (ex-post), and might be quite
costly. Jindal and Kerr (2007) note that transaction costs are a
signiﬁcant component of most PES schemes. For example, they
found that transaction costs in a carbon sequestration PES scheme
could range from 6% to 45% of the total PES cost. In a Mexican
study, one community spent more than $1.3 million U.S. (33% of
the budget) on transaction costs (Jindal and Kerr, 2007). Alpizar
and Madrigal (2008) found that the transaction costs of a PES
scheme in Copan, Honduras, were estimated around $4000 U.S.
per year. In the PES schemes being studied, no data were available
on the amount of transaction costs spent in the Lombok case.
However, a rough ﬁgure of the transaction costs was obtained in
the Lampung case. A study by Ariﬁn (2005) shows that the
transaction costs in the form of establishing property rights (the
HKm permit) over forest land in Sumber Jaya, Lampung, are
around $55.00 U.S. per household. This amount is more than half
of the annual income of these farm households and does not
include the opportunity costs that farmers have to incur due to the
slow and lengthy processes of obtaining the permit.
There are many different deﬁnitions for the term “transaction
costs.” In this paper, we adopt Allen's deﬁnition of transaction
costs (Allen, 1991) as the costs of establishing and protecting
property rights. In the world of perfect economies, zero transac-
tion costs would be associated with the optimal allocation of
goods and services. However, there is no such thing as a perfect
economy, and, therefore, transaction costs are ubiquitous. High
transaction costs would undoubtedly disrupt efﬁcient allocation.
Therefore, any mechanism to minimize transaction costs is sought.
Farmers and companies, for example, have incentives to adopt
contracts to minimize the dissipation of beneﬁts from transaction
costs (Lefﬂer and Rucker, 1991). According to Lefﬂer and Rucker
(1991), minimizing transaction costs could be accomplished
through payment options. In the forestry sector, for example, a
lump sum payment or payment for a unit of service could be used
to minimize transaction costs. However, for the PES scheme in
Lombok, this is not the case. The PES scheme payment does not
determine any transaction costs because the determination of the
payment is carried out simply by people's willingness to pay
(derived from a survey) and is not based on the costs of
maintaining rights within the PES scheme. In the PES scheme,
especially in developing countries such as Indonesia, attributes of
environmental services are very complex and difﬁcult to measure.
It might lead to commodity fetishism (Kosoy and Corbera, 2010),
the term coined by Karl Marx in nineteenth century, which refers
to the situation that a commodity is perceived to have some
magical power. Kosoy and Corbera (2010) extend this notion into
the PES context in which commodity fetishism in a PES scheme
might arise due to the complexity of ecosystem. In this case, the
PES system has ignored the complexity of the ecosystem so thatthe services can be transacted using monetary value. Therefore,
the system ignores the value of the ecosystem in a broader sense
(Kosoy and Corbera, 2010). This incomplete speciﬁcation and the
measurement of attributes alter transaction costs, which, in turn,
lower the value of the environmental services. Fig. 4 illustrates
changes in transaction costs as a function of PES scheme values.
Fig. 4 is adopted from Allen (2002). The diagram was originally
drawn by Umbeck (1977), and is modiﬁed and used for the context
of the PES scheme. The ﬁrst best value of asset is on the horizontal
axis (e.g. water sources in the forest area) whereby its value is
determined by the trading mechanism in the PES contract. On the
vertical axis are the beneﬁts and costs associated with the own-
ership of the asset obtained (e.g. through contract). If the owner-
ship is complete (i.e. ownership is perfectly deﬁned), the beneﬁts
are shown by the 451 line. That is, the beneﬁts from forming
property rights are equal to the value of assets when they are used
in their best use. The cost function in Fig. 4 represents the cost of
establishing and maintaining rights (i.e. the transaction cost
function that includes the cost of enforcing, moral hazards, etc.)
(Allen, 2002). It intersects at point C since, even though the asset
has no value, there would be positive costs due to activities such as
getting people together to negotiate a contract (Umbeck, 1977).
The vertical distance between the 451 line and the transaction cost
line represents the second best value of the asset. At V0, the
second best value of the asset is positive. Therefore, it is econom-
ical to form property right through a contract. The ﬁrst best value
at Vc represents the critical point regarding whether a contract
would exist. In the area to the left of Vc , the transaction cost is
higher than the beneﬁt of a contract. Therefore, it is not econom-
ical to form property right through a contract. In the PES case,
there is no point in establishing a PES scheme in this area because
the asset has no value, and no contract would be established
between buyers and sellers. This is a case where the area
designated for PES schemes is in the public domain, and establish-
ing a contract would be expensive.
When ownership is incomplete, such as in Indonesia's PES
schemes, the beneﬁts line falls as indicated by the dashed line
(pivoting clockwise). This could be due to an insufﬁcient or
incomplete contract, which is often experienced in a PES scheme
because of its complex environmental attributes. When property
rights are incomplete (e.g. farmers only acquire 60% of ownership),
the cost of enforcement is also lower (the cost of enforcing a 60%
property right is lower than the cost of enforcing a full property
right), as indicated by the new transaction cost dashed line.
Consequently, the second best value would also be lower, leading
to fewer incentives for farmers to conserve the environment or to
engage in a PES program.
As can be seen from Fig. 4, the second best value increases as
the value of the asset increases, and the vertical distance would be
greater the lower the transaction cost. The transaction cost
analysis enables us to understand why the PES scheme needs
more innovative breakthroughs in terms of contract, design, and
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and institutional arrangement within PES schemes.5. Concluding remarks
During the new order regime, Indonesia's dependency on
natural resources, especially on its forests, has resulted in unplea-
sant environmental consequences. In particular, these conse-
quences are deforestation and environmental degradation in the
forestry sector. The command and control approach practiced by
the new order regime has proved to be ineffective in controlling
encroachment, illegal logging, and other unsustainable forestry
practices, and in solving environmental problems. The PES system
is now recognized as one of some new market-based mechanisms
that are considered both attractive and acceptable at local levels.
This instrument is also gaining strong support since its recognition
in Law No. 32/2009 on Environmental Protection and Manage-
ment. The legal aspects of the PES scheme, however, raise two
critical issues.
First, the recognition of PES schemes in the laws, both nation-
ally and regionally, will eventually make the PES scheme a
mandatory mechanism rather than a voluntary mechanism as
described under the ideal PES scheme. Nonetheless, such a unique
arrangement could perhaps be used as a leverage to mainstream
the market-based environmental management, especially to pre-
vent further forest degradation in Indonesia. In Indonesian society,
voluntary initiatives for conserving forests are rather weak due to
poverty and other socio-economic constraints. Thus, the presence
of the legal aspect of the PES scheme would encourage local
governments to initiate more PES-like initiatives to address the
on-going environmental problems in Indonesia. In addition, it is
recognized that the government still plays a crucial role in making
PES programs work in Indonesia. However, the presence of legal
aspects of the PES scheme further complicates the management of
existing PES schemes as well as developing new schemes. The
complexity in laws and regulations as well as the problems of
establishing property rights over land use and land ownership has
hindered the effectiveness of various PES schemes in the country.
A second issue that needs more serious attention in PES
management, especially in the forest and its related watershed
areas, is ﬁscal arrangement. The results from the analysis of the
two PES programs in Lombok and Lampung show that, even
though there is some promising progress in solving watershed
and forestry problems in the upstream areas, the programs face
many challenges in terms of ﬁscal arrangement and higher
transaction costs. The evaluation of the current ﬁscal system to
accommodate revenues from environmental services is sorely
needed. In the absence of ﬁscal policy regarding the PES ﬁnancial
mechanism, some innovative breakthroughs are needed. Local
governments, especially at provincial levels, could use other
means such as government regulation on regional cooperation
(Government Regulation No. 50/2007) and government regulation
on regional incentives (Government Regulation No. 69/2010) to
remove ﬁscal constraints. In addition, other regulations regarding
regional autonomy and the decentralization of natural resource
management need to be streamlined so that they will not become
a bottleneck for PES implementation. Current drafts of governmen-
tal regulation on economic instruments for environmental manage-
ment, inwhich PES is one component that will be regulated in more
detail, need to be sped up for presidential approval because it is
from this regulation that other PES bylaws will follow at regional
levels. Although the proposed government regulation on economic
instruments for environmental management will not serve as a
silver bullet for entangling the complexity of the PES scheme in
Indonesia, it is expected to reduce uncertainty with respect to PESimplementation, and to provide a more comprehensive under-
standing of the PES mechanism.
From the two case studies, it seems that PES scheme arrange-
ment involving the private sector (i.e. the PES scheme in Lampung)
is less complicated and has a better chance to work than a public
funding mechanism (i.e. the PES scheme in Lombok). This is shown
also in other PES schemes involving the private sector such as in
Cidanau in Banten Province, Java, as studied in Budhi et al. (2008).
The private sector (in this case, the Krakatau Steel Industry)
provides cash payment to upstream farmers for a PES program
in upstream area. This scheme is less complicated in that it works
better than other PES schemes. This is because ex-ante transaction
costs are lower in the case of the private sector. There is no need to
conduct a survey of the willingness of residents to pay to determine
the payment. Other transaction costs associated with public funding
accountability and monitoring and evaluation are in the hand of the
private sector, and do not involve many other institutions. Never-
theless, a PES scheme involving the private sector also needs clear
property rights as well as legal back up from the local government
in order to function.
In conclusion, although the PES scheme is gaining popularity,
and is proposed to be widely adopted in Indonesia as a market-
based mechanism for environmental conservation, it cannot be
separated from its institutional facet. The market-based mechan-
ism alone will not solve the complex problems related to natural
resource management and environmental conservation. However,
the market-based mechanism could be used as a catalyst to
reinforce the beneﬁt of adopting PES schemes along with poverty
alleviation in a rural-based economy. The role of government and
other institutional arrangements still play a pivotal role in PES
implementation in developing countries such as Indonesia, yet
institutional complexity should be addressed before a PES scheme
is adopted.Acknowledgments
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